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INTRODUCTION
In Parliament and the Brexit Process, Stephen Tierney argues that the
Brexit process has generated rivals to parliamentary supremacy, and he outlines
the potential constraints upon Parliament presented by the “people” themselves
(through direct democracy), the Executive, the UK Supreme Court, and the
devolved territories of the United Kingdom.1 It is no real matter whether these
challengers to Parliament have emerged from, or, as I would argue, preexisted
Brexit; the upshot is that the traditional understanding of the British constitution
is now at odds with the current reality.
Tierney is undoubtedly correct in his broader analysis of the tensions that
Brexit has brought to light. In my response, therefore, I will focus on his
assessment of one of the rivals to Parliament’s authority—what Tierney terms
the “noisy neighbor”—the UK Supreme Court. He questions the Court’s
decision in R (Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. Advocate General for
Scotland (Miller II),2 in which the Court concluded that the Johnson
Government’s attempt to prorogue Parliament was unlawful.

* Professor, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. Conversation with Rosalind Dixon inspired
this article, and it has benefited from discussions at ICON-S Mundo, with particular thanks again to Ros,
as well as to Sam Issacharoff, Yaniv Roznai, and Yvonne Tew. And, of course, I am indebted to Stephen
Tierney for inviting me to respond to his thought-provoking lecture. Meher Babbar, Adam Clark,
Alexandra Dakich, Emily Grant, Jack Steele, and Cole Turner provided excellent research assistance. As
always, Tom Gaylord and the staff of the Pritzker Legal Research Center have proven invaluable.
1
Stephen Tierney, Parliament and the Brexit Process, 12 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2022).
2
R (Miller) v. Prime Minister/Cherry v. Advocate Gen. for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41 (appeals taken from
Eng. & Scot.) [hereinafter Miller II].

2022

THE UKS BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE

23

An “incendiary judgment,”3 Miller II has been the topic of extensive debate
in legal circles, with many focusing on the arguments internal to the British legal
order that support or undermine the decision. In short, is the Court applying
settled law or playing politics? Tierney echoes these arguments. He sees the
decision as “an astonishing level of interference by the courts with the political
constitution,” and wonders about future claims to judicial authority over (or
constraint of) Parliament.4
In the following Essay, I argue that Miller II is better evaluated by applying
an external lens. Denying the above dichotomy, I accept that the decision rests
in the liminal space between law and politics and draw on the basic structure
doctrine to analyze the Miller II decision.5 I play out the implications of the
comparative analogy and propose a functional justification of the UK Supreme
Court’s decision. In so doing, I agree with Tierney that the Court has asserted
itself beyond its usual role but conclude that it is far from certain that Miller II
itself will translate into greater judicial power.

I: MILLER II: BACKGROUND AND RECEPTION
On August 28, 2019, two months before the United Kingdom was set to exit
the European Union (Brexit), Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that he
had advised Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to prorogue Parliament for a period
of five weeks,6 from roughly 9 September until 14 October 2019.7 Prorogation
is a prerogative act, exercised by the Crown on the advice of her Ministers, and
it serves to end a Parliamentary session.8 As a result of prorogation, all
proceedings in both Houses end, and while Parliament is prorogued, there are
no formal debates, no opportunity to submit questions or otherwise scrutinize
government departments or actions.9

3

Mark Elliott, Constitutional Adjudication and Constitutional Politics in the United Kingdom: The Miller
II Case in Legal and Political Context, 16 EUR. CON. L. REV. 625, 626 (2020) [hereinafter Elliott, The
Miller II Case].
4
See Tierney, supra note 1, at 18.
5
A few commentators have gestured at this analogy. Anurag Deb, A Constitution of Principles: From
Miller
to
Minerva
Mills,
U.K.
CONST.
L.
BLOG
(Oct.
1,
2019),
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/10/01/anurag-deb-a-constitution-of-principles-from-miller-tominerva-mills/ (arguing that like the Indian Supreme Court, the UK Supreme Court faced the threat of
“politically heavy-handed executive action dressed up in wafer-thin constitutional justification,” and
responded to it by drawing on fundamental constitutional principles to prevent such action); Kaleeswaram
Raj, Lessons from a Landmark Brexit Verdict, THE NEW INDIAN EXPRESS (Oct. 3, 2019), available at
https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2019/oct/03/lessons-from-a-landmark-brexit-verdict2042528.html (“There is a general perception that R (Miller) v Prime Minister, in its own way, laid down
the UK’s ‘Basic structure doctrine’ during a pernicious situation. The Indian judgment directed itself
against executive and legislative excessiveness whereas the UK verdict tried to forestall the executive
high-handedness and protect Parliament.”).
6
Brexit: Boris Johnson ‘approved Parliament shutdown plan in mid-August’, BBC NEWS, Sept. 3, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-49550874.
7
Miller II, supra note 2, at [17].
8
Dissolution is the other way to end a Parliamentary session. See generally Richard Kelly, Dissolution
of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 05085 (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05085/SN05085.pdf.
9
Graeme Cowie, Prorogation of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 8589
(June 11, 2019), 11–12, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8589/CBP8589.pdf.
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The possibility of proroguing Parliament had been floated as early as June
2019, as a means of ending the machinations surrounding the final withdrawal
agreement under which Britain would leave the European Union.10 In early
2019, the House of Commons had thrice rejected the withdrawal agreement
negotiated by the Teresa May Government.11 In order to avoid a no-deal Brexit,
Parliament, through the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019, required the
Prime Minister to seek an extension of the notification period with the European
Union.12 And in April, Prime Minister May asked for and was granted an
extension until 31 October 2019.13 She resigned the leadership of the
Conservative Party in early June, and a leadership contest began. One leading
contender for the position, Boris Johnson, had made it clear that he was prepared
to leave the EU without an agreement.14 An extended prorogation would serve
to end debate and avoid scrutiny of a no-deal Brexit.
The mere suggestion of using the prorogation power in this manner raised
concerns from a cross-party coalition of MPs and members of the House of
Lords.15 And shortly following Boris Johnson’s installation as Prime Minister
on 24 July 2019, they brought a petition on 30 July 2019 in the Court of Session
in Scotland seeking a declaration that such a prorogation would be unlawful and
an injunction (interdict) to prevent it.16 At that time, the issue was a hypothetical
one, but it became live a few weeks later.17 And upon that announcement, Gina
Miller brought proceedings challenging the prorogation as unlawful in the High
Court of England and Wales.18
The prorogation was announced during the summer parliamentary recess,
and when Parliament reconvened in early September, it passed the European
Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, requiring the Prime Minister to seek an
additional extension to the exit date on 19 October, unless prior to that date,
Parliament had either approved a withdrawal agreement or approved a resolution
accepting a no-deal exit.19
On 10 September, the (putative) prorogation began, and the UK Supreme
Court heard arguments arising from the two lower court decisions from 17 to 19
September. The Court concluded that the issue was justiciable and the
prorogation was unlawful, issuing its decision on 24 September. Following the

Raab won’t rule out suspending Parliament to force no-deal Brexit, SCOTSMAN
(June 5, 2019, 8:25 PM), https://www.scotsman.com/news/uk-news/raab-wont-rule-out-suspendingparliament-force-no-deal-brexit-1416053. See also Graeme Cowie, Prorogation of Parliament, HOUSE
OF
COMMONS
LIBR.,
BRIEFING
PAPER
NO.
8589
25
(June
11,
2019),
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8589/CBP-8589.pdf.
11
Miller II, supra note 2, at [12].
12
Id. at [13].
13
Id.
14
Id. at [14].
15
Id. at [23].
16
Cherry v. Advocate Gen., [2019] CSIH 49 (Scot.) (Inner House unanimously ruled that the attempted
prorogation was both justiciable and illegitimate).
17
Toby Helm & Heather Stewart, Boris Johnson seeks legal advice on five-week parliament closure
ahead
of
Brexit,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
24,
2019,
4:02
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/aug/24/johnson-seeks-legal-advice-parliament-closure.
18
R (Miller) v. Prime Minister, [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB) (court held the issue not justiciable and
dismissed it, but also granted a “leap-frog” certificate so that the case could be argued before the Supreme
Court).
19
European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019, c. 26, § 1 (U.K.).
10
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decision, John Bercow, the colorful Speaker of the House,20 delivered a
statement in person announcing Parliament would sit the following day at
11:30am.21
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, the lawyerly and scholarly
community has bifurcated into two main camps: those opposed to the decision
on the grounds that it was an impermissible intrusion of the UK Supreme Court
into the political constitution and thus an illegitimate use of the judicial function,
and those who contend that the decision reflects constitutional orthodoxy and is
properly rooted in precedent and principle. In this Part, after briefly reviewing
the substance of the decision, I will outline this scholarly debate and present a
third option, that the Court might have acted outside the bounds of orthodoxy
but was legitimate in doing so – an argument I develop further in Part II.
A. THE DECISION
The unanimous decision of the full complement of sitting Justices addressed
two main issues presented by the prorogation: (1) Could the Court adjudicate the
lawfulness of the Prime Minister’s advice to the Queen to prorogue Parliament;
and then, if justiciable, (2) was it lawful?22 The Court formulated the question
of justiciability as a category determination. What exactly was the Court being
asked? Was it to determine “where a legal limit lies in relation to the power to
prorogue Parliament,” or “the lawfulness of a particular exercise of the power
within its legal limits”?23 The Court concluded it was being asked the extent of
prerogative powers, a justiciable matter. It arrived at this determination by first
situating the power to prorogue as a power recognized by the common law,24
and noting that the sovereignty of Parliament and Parliamentary
accountability—two “fundamental principles” of constitutional law—require
some legal limits on the power of prorogation.25 Without such limits, Parliament
could be prorogued indefinitely, “prevent[ing] Parliament from exercising its

Throughout Bercow’s tenure as Speaker and most acutely regarding his handling of Brexit, he was
known as a champion of Parliament’s rights to his supporters and a subverter of MP–executive relations
to his opponents. See Adam Cygan, Philip Lynch, & Richard Whitaker, UK Parliamentary Scrutiny of
the EU Political and Legal Space After Brexit, 58 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1605, 1614 (2020); see also
William James, Speaker John Bercow, UK Parliament’s Brexit Umpire-Cum-Player, Steps Down,
REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-politics-speaker/speaker-johnbercow-uk-parliaments-brexit-umpire-cum-player-steps-down-idUSKBN1X9214. Bercow utilized
technical devices of parliamentary procedure and historical precedent in his efforts to defend, or expand,
the sovereignty of Parliament. See Andrew Barry, Afterword: ‘I Will Play My Part!’, or Parliamentary
Politics in Action, 50(2) SOC. STUD. SCI. 335, 336 (2020); see also Chris Mullin, In Defence of John
Bercow, PROSPECT (March 2, 2020), https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/in-defence-of-johnbercow-memoir-review-chris-mullin; Christopher Watson, House of Commons Trends: Urgent
Questions, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/house-ofcommons-trends-urgent-questions/.
21
Rowena Mason & Peter Walker, MPs to Return Immediately in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019), 9:01 AM, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/24/bercow-mpsreturn-urgent-supreme-court-ruling-suspension-parliament.
22
Miller II, supra note 2, at [27] (noting also the issues of by what standard lawfulness should be judged
and, if unlawful, what remedies were available).
23
Id. at [37] (emphasis added).
24
Id. at [30].
25
Id. at [41].
20
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legislative authority,”26 or compromising its ability “to carry out its
constitutional functions” of holding the executive accountable.27
The Court then determined that the Prime Minister’s advice was not lawful,
noting that the advice had an “extreme effect upon the fundamentals of our
democracy” and thus warranted “a reasonable justification.”28 The extreme
effect was “frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in
holding the Government to account,” in the “exceptional” circumstances
surrounding Brexit.29 And the Court found that the Government failed to present
“any reason” for the five week prorogation. In determining the remedy, a
declaration that the prorogation was “unlawful, null and of not effect,” the Court
also considered the relevance of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1688,
protecting “proceedings in Parliament” from judicial review.30 The Court
concluded that the prorogation was not such a “proceeding in Parliament.”
B. UNORTHODOX AND ILLEGITIMATE, ORTHODOX AND LEGITIMATE, OR
UNORTHODOX AND LEGITIMATE?
The negative reaction to the Miller II decision was swift. Roughly a week
after the decision was handed down, Oxford scholar John Finnis contributed a
scathing evaluation of its reasoning in a post entitled “The unconstitutionality of
the Supreme Court’s prorogation judgment.”31 In the post, he accused the
Supreme Court of intruding into the political constitution, 32 by “usurping the
responsibility” that the constitution had “assigned to others.” Determining the
boundaries of the prerogative power over prorogation was a political issue, not
a legal one.33 The Court erred in finding the issue justiciable, and it should have
declined to hear the case.34 And the Court’s effort to distinguish between the
bounds of the prerogative power and its exercise was a “card-shuffle, a fudge,”
an “argumentational sleight[] of hand.”35
The critics read the decision as judicializing politics and threatening the
traditional political constitution.36 Parliamentary accountability had been
26

Id. at [42], [45].
Id. at [48], [46].
28
Id. at [57].
29
Id. at [55], [57].
30
Id. at [63]–[69]. Article 9 states: “That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in
Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.” BILL OF
RIGHTS, art. 9, 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c.2 (U.K.).
31
John Finnis, The unconstitutionality of the Supreme Court’s prorogation judgment, JUD. POWER
PROJECT (Oct. 2, 2019), https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/the-unconstitutionality-of-the-supremecourts-prorogation-judgment-john-finnis/.
32
Political constitutionalists argue that the central aspect of the British constitution is its having vested
power in a democratic, representative body. Parliamentary sovereignty protects democracy and selfgovernance. There is no need for external judicial checks on parliamentary power. See, e.g., Erin F.
Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 543, 548–
53 (2015).
33
Finnis, supra note 31.
34
See Edward Willis, The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller No 2, [2019] N.Z. L.J.
352, 352 (describing view that prorogation was “strictly a political matter” as the “prevailing expectation”
and reviewing Canadian experience in support).
35
Aileen McHarg, The Supreme Court’s Prorogation Judgment: Guardian of the Constitution or
Architect of the Constitution?, 24 EDINBURGH L. REV. 88, 89 (2020).
36
See Michel Rosenfeld, Judicial Politics versus Ordinary Politics, in JUDICIAL POWER 36, 44 (Christine
Landfried ed., 2019) (describing the “constitutionalization of politics, understood as involving a shift
from ordinary to judicial politics”). See also McHarg, supra note 31, at 89 (arguing that the Court had
27
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understood as a political convention,37 not something to be enforced by a court.
Indeed, as Timothy Endicott wrote, even “the fact that Parliament should meet
as appropriate does not support the conclusion that the law requires it to meet as
appropriate.” 38 As he says, “why should the court do the protecting?”39 These
scholars were unpersuaded by the argument that because “prerogative power is
recognized by common law[,] [] it must be exercised in accordance with (socalled) common law principles.”40 They bristled at the idea that the Supreme
Court could be claiming “an open-ended power to make constitutional principles
into laws.”41 Parliament itself and the political process could be trusted to
monitor the prerogative power.42 The Court was acting as the “primary guardian
of the British constitution,” a role which it was not intended to play and not
competent to assume.43
In contrast, defenders claimed that Miller II should be understood as a
statement of constitutional orthodoxy,44 in line with the expectations of the
common law constitution.45 In the words of Paul Craig, parliamentary
sovereignty “has always contained conditions for its exercise,”46 and
parliamentary accountability has long been understood as a constitutional
principle animating judicial review.47 Indeed, to the extent the decision broke
new ground, it did so through the natural extension of established principles.48
And these constitutional principles can “sound in both the political and legal
spheres.”49 At bottom, the prerogative power must be subject to the principle of

“engaged in considerable creativity in casting itself as the guardian at common law of constitutional
values hitherto regarded as grounded in the political rather than the legal constitution”).
37
Cf. Elliott, The Miller II Case, supra note 3, at 632 (describing ministerial accountability to Parliament
as a long-established political convention).
38
Timothy Endicott, Making Constitutional Principles into Laws, 136 L.Q. REV. 175, 178 (2020).
39
Id.
40
Martin Loughlin, A note on Craig on Miller; Cherry, 2020 PUB. L. 278, 279.
41
Endicott, supra note 38, at 178 (“The essential implicit premise needed to make sense of Miller and
Cherry is that the High Court has an open-ended power to make constitutional principles into laws.”).
42
To the extent the Johnson decision to prorogue may have indicated some weakness in the political
constitution, some proffered other non-judicial institutional solutions. See Stefan Theil, Unconstitutional
Prorogation of Parliament, 2020 PUBLIC L. 529 (arguing that monarchical intervention in the face of a
controversial prorogation of Parliament might be preferable to that of the judiciary).
43
Martin Loughlin, A note on Craig on Miller; Cherry, 2020 PUBLIC L. 278, 280.
44
See, e.g., Paul Craig, The Supreme Court, Prorogation and Constitutional Principle, 2020 PUB. L. 248;
Alison Young, Deftly Guarding the Constitution, JUD. POWER PROJECT (Sept. 29, 2019),
http://judicialpowerprogject.org.uk/alison-young-deftly-guarding-the-constitution/;
Nick
Barber,
Constitutional Hardball and Justified Development of the Law, JUD. POWER PROJECT (Sept. 29, 2019),
http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/nick-barber-constitutional-hardball-and-justified-development-of-thelaw/.
45
Common law constitutionalism imposes limitations on the legislature through the common law itself,
supported by the argument that parliamentary sovereignty itself is a common law construct. See, e.g.,
Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism, 23
OXFORD LEGAL STUD. 435 (2003); Robert Stevens, Government and the Judiciary, in THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 333 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 2003); Mark Elliott, The Ultra
Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law, 58
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 129 (1999).
46
Craig, supra note 44, at 252.
47
Id. at 258–59.
48
Elliott, The Miller II Case, supra note 3, at 629. See also Young, supra note 42; Barber, supra note 42
(arguing Miller II “forms part of a long line of jurisprudence”).
49
Elliott, The Miller II Case, supra note 3, at 633.
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legality,50 or parliamentary sovereignty itself is distorted to the executive’s
whim.51
Finnis concludes that the Court’s decision—its assessment “first of risks,
and then of the degree of need to avert them despite the side-effects of attempting
to—is the very heart or core of this Judgment. That core is neither legal nor
constitution-based. Like choices by constitution-drafters and legislatures, it is
purely political.”52 Can such an unorthodox display nevertheless be legitimate?
Some have suggested a kind of necessity argument: Jack Caird has written that,
“when the constitution is under strain from all sides, it is normal that Parliament
and the judiciary are asked to make decisions on questions of constitutional
interpretation which are inherently political.”53 And Edward Willis has
suggested that “when staring into the precipice, both law and politics become
secondary considerations ordered around the normative gravity of fundamental
constitutional principle.”54 But was the Court (or the country) staring into the
precipice? Finnis would guffaw. He proffered that the Court was acting
disingenuously, “for fear of some confessedly ‘hypothetical’ and ‘extreme’
abuse which for centuries has been judged preventable by other, existing, nonjudicial constraints”55
In the next Part, I argue that it is possible to understand Miller II as an
example of the Court’s acting outside the bounds of British constitutional
orthodoxy and yet in a legitimate manner by drawing on the extensive
comparative insights provided by the basic structure doctrine, including its
methodology and its justification.

II: COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS AND CONTEXTUAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The debate evaluating the legitimacy of Miller II is largely internal to British
law and does not present the possibility that the decision could be both
unorthodox and legitimate: A decision that tests the bounds of the judicial role
by its necessarily political nature, but that is, nevertheless, an appropriate step
for the Court to take. By turning to comparative constitutionalism, it is possible
to root the Miller II decision within an ongoing political and scholarly debate
about the role of courts in moments of constitutional crisis. This Part argues that
the basic structure doctrine serves as the comparative analogue to Miller II and
draws on the literature surrounding the basic structure doctrine to derive a test
for evaluating the UK Supreme Court’s actions in Miller II.
A. BASIC STRUCTURE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

50

Id. at 636–38; Craig, supra note 44, at 264.
Craig, supra note 44, at 264.
52
Finnis, supra note 31, at 15.
53
Jack Simson Caird, The Politics of Constitutional Interpretation in the UK, JUD. POWER PROJECT, Oct.
1, 2019, available at http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/jack-simson-caird-bingham-centre-for-the-ruleof-law-the-politics-of-constitutional-interpretation-in-the-uk/.
54
Willis, supra note 34, at 354.
55
Finnis, supra note 31, at 8.
51

2022

THE UKS BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE

29

The UK Supreme Court’s definition of the UK constitution’s core elements
sounds in the register of “basic structure,”56 drawn on most often by courts in
systems with written constitutions when confronted with fundamentally altering
constitutional amendments. The roots of the Basic Structure Doctrine lie in the
Indian Supreme Court’s 1967 decision, Golaknath v. State of Punjab,57 which
first introduced the idea that a constitutional amendment which threatened core
constitutional guarantees could be invalid. The specific justifications used in that
case were abandoned and replaced in 1973 in Kesavananda Bharti v. State of
Kerala.58 In Kesavananda, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the TwentyFourth Amendment to the Indian Constitution as an attempt to alter “the basic
structure” of the Constitution.
The Kesavananda decision has been called perhaps the “most important
case decided by a constitutional court in the twentieth century,”59 and its
approach has been drawn on by courts around the world.60 The central tenets of
the basic structure doctrine are (a) that there are “certain fundamental features .
. . not spelt out in the Constitution but which are inherent in its very nature,
design and purpose,”61 and (b) that an attempt to alter these features, even if
procedurally adequate under constitutional provisions for amendment, may be
substantively unconstitutional.
As many have noted, this articulation of the doctrine fails to provide much
clarity.62 First: what are, as described by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its
56

Cf. SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA xxxi (2009); see also
S.R. Bonmai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918, 1956 –57 (Verma, J., concurring) (suggesting the
review of an emergency proclamation is commensurate with judicial review of prerogative powers at
common law).
57
Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762. Note that the idea of “unconstitutional constitutional
amendments” in constitutional theory reaches back much farther. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L.
657, 669–75 (2013). Roznai further identifies a 1950 decision of the Bavarian Constitutional Court as
introducing the idea of unconstitutional constitutional norms to post-World War II jurisprudence. Id. at
676.
58
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
59
Vivek Krishnamurthy, Note, Colonial Cousins: Explaining India and Canada’s Unwritten
Constitutional Principles, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 207, 225 (2009) (acknowledging that “reasonable people
can disagree” as to whether it was “the first or second most important case”).
60
See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], julio 9, 2003, Sentencia C-551/03 (Colom.)
(limiting constitutional amendment power under “substitution theory”); Opinion No. 0024-2005-PI/TC
(02.11.2005) (Peru) (rejecting argument that amendments constitute a “non-justiciable political
question”); Corte Const., 15 dicembre 1988, n. 1146, Racc. uff. corte cost. (It.) (finding “supreme values”
protected from constitutional revision); Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court], June 23,
1988, Erkenntnisse und Beschlüsse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes [VfSlg] 29, No. 102/88 (Austria)
(prohibiting “total revision” of constitution); Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 09.10.2009 (US) [Decision
of the Constitutional Court of Sept. 10, 2009] sp.zn. PI (Czech) (protecting “constitutive principles” of
democracy); Anayasa Mahkemesi [AYM] [Constitutional Court] June 5, 2008, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/116
45 AYMKD 1195 (Turk.) (protecting secularism as unamendable norm); Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v.
Bangladesh, 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165. (Bangl.) (noting twenty-one unamenable constitutional
features); Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 426, 458, 479-80 (Pak.)
(articulating limits on amendments); J. Y. Interpretation No. 499 (03/24/2000) (Taiwan) (blocking
transformation of National Assembly); Premier of KwaZulu-Natal v. President of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (1) SA 769 (CC), 1995 (12) BCLR 1561 (CC) (S. Afr.) (questioning whether an amendment
can restructure constitution fundamentals); Njoya v. Attorney General, [2004] LLR 4788 (HCK) (Kenya)
(holding amending constitution substitute or destroy the existing constitution); British Caribbean Bank
Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. of Belize, Claim No. 597 of 2011 (Belize) (invalidating amendment for
“destroy[ing]” fundamental norms). See also Roznai, supra note 57, at 681–707.
61
Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v. President of the Republic of South Africa 1995
(10) BCLR 1289 (CC) at para. 204.
62
Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational constitutionalism and a limited doctrine of
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own discussion of the doctrine, “the salient features of the Constitution,”63 and
how are they to be determined?64 Something foundational must be at stake: As
Judge Jaganmohan Reddy said in Kesavananda, “[t]he edifice of our
Constitution is built upon and stands upon several props, remove any of them
and the Constitution collapses.”65 And courts around the world have found
unwritten constitutional principles to include, inter alia, the rule of law,66
federalism,67 democracy,68 judicial independence,69 and separation of powers.70
Second, how is a court to know when an attempt to alter these basic
structures reaches the level of unconstitutionality? In the Indian context, “[t]he
phrase which best captures the standard of review applied is whether the state
action ‘destroys or damages the basic features or basic structure of the
Constitution.’”71 This phrase suggests a “high threshold of constitutional
injury,”72 but as Judge Chandrachud wrote about the basic structure doctrine in
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, “one swallow does not make a summer.”73 Some
mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis is needed to determine the harm
to the basic structure.74
Quite apart from the challenges in operationalizing the doctrine, it raises
core legitimacy questions, pitting the operation of judicial review against
exercises of the democratic will. The majority of commentary on the concept
attempts to navigate this paradox of “unconstitutional constitutional
amendments.” A key focus is on textual provisions in systems with written
constitutions: Does the constitution itself purport to authorize its constitutional
court to develop a doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments?75 Are
unconstitutional constitutional amendment, 13 INT’L J. CON. L. 606, 629 (2015) [hereinafter Dixon &
Landau, Transnational constitutionalism].
63
Roznai, supra note 57, at 696 (citing MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
PAKISTAN 81-88 (2006)).
64
KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 56, at 147 (“The most persistent and harsh criticism of the basic structure
doctrine over the many years of its existence has been directed at the open-ended nature of the basic
feature catalogue.”).
65
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, 1206 (Jaganmohan Reddy, J).
66
See British Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. of Belize, Claim No. 597 of 2011 (Belize); Reference
re Secession of Quebec (Quebec Secession Reference), [1998] 2 S.C.R.217, para. 32 (Can.) (finding the
Constitution of Canada embraces “four fundamental and organizing principles. . . : federalism;
democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law; and respect for minorities.”).
67
See Reference re Secession of Quebec (Quebec Secession Reference), [1998] 2 S.C.R.217, para. 32
(Can.).; Zafar Ali Shah v Pervez Musharraf, 52 PLD (SC) 869 (Pak.) (finding “[t]hat no amendment shall
be made in the salient features of the Constitution i.e., independence of Judiciary, federalism,
parliamentary form of government blended with Islamic provisions.”).
68
See Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165 (Bangl.); Nález Ústavního
soudu ze dne 09.10.2009 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Sept. 10, 2009], sp.zn. PI (Czech);
J. Y. Interpretation No. 499 (03/24/2000) (Sing.).
69
Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, 41 DLR 1989 App. Div. 165 (Bangl.); Zafar Ali Shah v
Pervez Musharraf, 52 PLD (SC) 869 (Pak.).
70
Vivek, Krishnamurthy, Colonial Cousins: Explaining India and Canada’s Unwritten Constitutional
Principles, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 207, 208, 230 (2009) (drawing similarities between unwritten
constitutional principles in Canada and India, attributed to structural similarities and necessities in
interpretation of “new” constitutions). Krishnamurthy posits both courts rely on these principles as
“outcome-determinative principles of constitutional law” in lieu of constitutional textual interpretation.
Id. at 230.
71
KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 56, at 72.
72
Id.
73
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299.
74
Cf. KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 56, at 114–15.
75
See RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2019). But see KRISHNASWAMY, supra note
56, at 88 (“a model of basic structure review which is focussed on the text of the constitution will fail to
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there eternity clauses76 or otherwise different or tiered amendment provisions?77
Of course, there is a distinction between unamendability provisions written into
constitutions, and decisions by courts to engage with basic structure doctrines
unconnected to textual requirements. Yaniv Roznai has suggested that “[t]he
basic structure doctrine is ‘an attempt to identify the moral philosophy on which
the Constitution is based,’”78 which goes far beyond parsing of text.79
In the latter case, where a court looks to the spirit of the constitutional
scheme rather than to text, the justifications proffered for judicial review are
necessarily more political. Roznai himself has argued that the use of the doctrine
is justified by the theory of the constituent power: the people create the
constitution and thus only the people—acting in their pre-constitutional form—
could fundamentally alter that constitution.80 Any action by the constituted
authorities (by the government or by entities acting within the constitutionally
created amendment process) must be consistent with the values of the enacted
constitution.81 This argument resonates with justifications for more normal
variations of judicial review,82 and in some ways the basic structure doctrine
becomes a difference in degree, rather than a difference in kind.
Others have argued, however, that the basic structure doctrine “raises
special problems of legitimacy not faced by ordinary exercises of judicial
review, and thus requires special justification.”83 The dramatic nature of a
court’s resort to basic structure has been described as “chemotherapy for a
carcinogenic body politic”84 or “a dire cure for a drastic disorder.”85
Commentators have recognized that danger lurks both in relying upon (or in
failing to rely upon) the doctrine. And, in this vein, Dixon and Landau root the
justification in a kind of democratic pragmatism.86 Their focus on the
democracy-enhancing aspects of the doctrine is not in tension with Roznai’s
preserve constitutional principles as it is both under inclusive and over inclusive in its scope of
protection”).
76
See generally SILVIA SUTEU, ETERNITY CLAUSES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM (2021)
(contextualizing democratic challenges of formal and implicit unamendability); Ridwanul Hoque, Eternal
Provisions in the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Constitution Once and for All? In AN UNAMENDABLE
CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES 195-229 (Richard Albert &
Bertil Emrah Oder eds., 2018).
77
See generally Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Tiered Constitutional Design, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
438 (2018) (highlighting the prevalence, benefits, and shortcomings of tiered constitutional design);
Richard Albert, The Forms of Unamendability, in AN UNAMENDABLE CONSTITUTION?
UNAMENDABILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES 1-26 (Richard Albert & Bertil Emrah Oder eds.,
2018) (overviewing theory of unamendable portions of constitutions).
78
Roznai, supra note 57, at 692 (citing Salman Khurshid, The Court, the Constitution, and the People, in
THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION: A CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 95, 98 (Pran Chopra
ed., 2006)).
79
See Gary Geffrey Jacobsohn, An unconstitutional constitution? A comparative perspective, 4 INT’L J.
CON. L. 460, 478 (2006).
80
See generally YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2017).
81
Id. at 478–79. Cf. Jacobsohn, supra note 81, at 478 (“a polis’s identity changes when the constitution
(referring to more than just a document) changes as the result of a disruption in its essential commitments,
much as a chorus is a different chorus when it appears in a tragedy rather than a comedy.”).
82
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
83
Dixon & Landau, Transnational constitutionalism, supra note 62, at 609.
84
Upendra Baxi, Preface to S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA, at XVI (2001).
85
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. OF DEM. 70, 82 (2007).
86
This approach shares similarities with the justifications used for stronger judicial review in fragile
democracies. See Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 Geo. L. J. 961
(2011); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES (2015) (presenting strong constitutional courts
as an antidote to threats of authoritarianism and geopolitical vulnerabilities).
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focus on the “people” and delegated constituent authority,87 but it is more
expansive and can exist outside the bounds of a system with a written
constitution. Dixon and Landau argue the doctrine is justified when it “poses a
real risk to democratic constitutionalism” itself.88 The legitimacy concerns are
mitigated in the face of measures which work “to cut off future exercises of
democratic decision-making,”89 or function to “allow leaders to increase their
hold on power or to undermine institutions that were previously acting as a
check.”90
This attention to abusive constitutional change adds important context to the
second prong of the two-part test: is there evidence of democratic backsliding?
Is the constitutional system no longer working as intended? These questions
clearly introduce “a convergence of legal and political issues,”91 and it is unclear
how effective a court can be at assessing these threats. Overestimating the
danger could lead to overuse of the doctrine,92 undermining its legitimacy as an
action of last resort.93 And then again, one swallow may not make a summer, but
(to stick with fauna) there is little point shutting the barn door after the horse has
bolted.94 And thus, taking a holistic view is necessary: “Constitutional changes
that, by themselves, may not pose any significant threat to democracy may
become far more threatening in combination, or in aggregate.”95
In viewing the UK Supreme Court’s Miller II decision through the lens of
the basic structure doctrine, the decision’s legitimacy will turn on the externalist,
pragmatic justification provided by Dixon and Landau. The UK’s lack of
codified constitution and the complications that itself presents for constituent
power in the United Kingdom leave few other routes for legitimation.96 Could
the UK Supreme Court have properly viewed Boris Johnson’s decision to
prorogue Parliament as a threat to the constitutional order?
B. A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

87

Dixon & Landau, Transnational constitutionalism, supra note 62, at 612.
Id. at 609. Cf. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 237 (2013)
(describing “certain extreme exercises of political power that threaten the institutional order itself”).
89
Dixon & Landau, Transnational constitutionalism, supra note 62, at 612. They further suggest that
some of these types of actions may be “likely to be manipulated rather than real exercises of democratic
will,” thus reinforcing the legitimacy of a court’s intervention. Id.
90
Id. at 613; see also William Partlett, Courts and Constitution-Making, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 921,
927 (2015) (discussing actions which “weaken the autonomy of checking institutions and undermine
individual rights”).
91
Ashok H. Desai, Constitutional Amendments and the ‘Basic Structure’ Doctrine, in DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 71, 73 (Venkat Iyer ed. 2000).
92
Cf. Dixon & Landau, Transnational constitutionalism, supra note 62, at 615.
93
Cf. Desai, supra note 92, at 90 (describing the doctrine as a “rare residuary power”).
94
Some commentators seemed to accept that if the prorogation had been obviously abusive, necessity
would have permitted its nullification, though in such a circumstance, the implementation of that judicial
decision may be unlikely. Endicott, supra note 38, at 181 (“But if it proved to be the case that only
recourse to the courts would prevent indefinite prorogation of Parliament (and if the judges were still able
to get to work in the morning, and if their declarations were given effect), then you have imagined a
justification for judges to assume the power to nullify a prorogation: necessity. In that case, a court could
justifiably create a new legal rule to meet a constitutional need”).
95
Dixon & Landau, Transnational constitutionalism, supra note 62, at 625.
96
Whether the basic structure doctrine is applicable beyond constitutional amendments to regular
legislative or executive action is a matter of some debate. In the context of the United Kingdom, the
uncodified political constitution expands the scope of what might be considered a constitutional
amendment, thus sidestepping the controversy. My thanks to Yaniv Roznai for raising this issue.
88
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As noted in Part I, the UK Supreme Court focused on the likely future
dangers of prorogation to the principle of Parliamentary accountability. The
concern animating the Court was the risk that, during a prorogation, “responsible
government may be replaced by unaccountable government.”97 The Court did
not determine that such a situation would have resulted by virtue of the
prorogation advised by Boris Johnson, nor did it delve into the possible
motivations of the Prime Minister in requesting it. The Court simply noted that
as no reasonable justification for the five-week prorogation was proffered,
Parliament had been unlawfully prorogued.
Recasting the Miller II decision in the guise of the basic structure doctrine
begins easily, as the “principle of Parliamentary accountability” is generally
accepted as a foundational element of the British constitutional order.98 The
principle of Parliamentary accountability can be understood as reflecting
responsible government, a cornerstone of Westminster-style parliamentary
systems around the world.99 In the words of the-Justice Kiefel of the High Court
of Australia, responsible government creates a relationship “between the
Parliament and the Executive [in which] the former is superior to the latter.”100
In short, it requires the “accountability of ministers, or of the government as a
whole, to an elected assembly.”101
What then of the second stage of the doctrinal analysis? Was the prorogation
a single swallow, or was it somehow indicative of a larger challenge to
constitutional democracy in the United Kingdom? The court itself wrote that the
case “arises in circumstances which have never arisen before and are unlikely
ever to arise again,”102 giving some ammunition to those who argued this was
far from a constitutional crisis. But a broader view of the constitutional changes
roiling the operation of the British state suggests that responsible government as
a central tenet of the British constitution is “increasingly honored in the
breach.”103 And in this subsection, I argue that it is certainly plausible for a court
to have concluded that responsible government was in some peril and that a fiveweek prorogation in these circumstances was a step too far.
A number of commentators, as well as the litigants themselves, highlighted
the complicated political backdrop to the decision and the “febrile atmosphere”
of late summer 2019.104 As Mark Elliot has written, it was “widely believed”
that the purpose of the prorogation was to prevent Parliament from taking any
action to limit the Government’s freedom in effectuating Brexit.105 But even
97

R (on the application of Miller) v. Prime Minister; Cherry and others v. Advocate General for Scotland,
[2019] UKSC 41 [48] (emphasis added).
98
See, e.g., Graziella Romeo, The Conceptualization of Judicial Supremacy: Global Discourse and Legal
Tradition,
21 GERMAN L. J. 904, 913 (2020) (describing parliamentary accountability as one of
generally agreed upon basic elements of the British constitution); Willis, supra note 34, at 354 (describing
parliamentary accountability as a longstanding central tenet).
99
See David Kinley, The Duty to Govern and the Pursuit of Accountable Government in Australia and
the United Kingdom, 21 MONASH U. L. REV. 116, 119 (1995).
100
Williams v. Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 [579].
101
A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION 20 (1964).
102
Miller II, [2019] UKSC 41 at [1].
103
Elliott, The Miller II Case, supra note 3, at 632.
104
Elliott, The Miller II Case, supra note 3, at 626. See also Case for the Respondents, ON APPEAL
FROM THE COURT OF SESSION FIRST DIVISION Inner House Judgment: [2019] CSIH 49, In the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, UKSC 2019/0193, at 9.3, 1.5(4)(i),
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/written-case-for-joanna-cherry-qc-mp.pdf.
105
Id. at 628.
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assuming this purpose, some concluded that the Court was wrong to intervene,
as Parliament could itself have reversed the prorogation, but it did not. Indeed,
Parliament could have exercised “its key control over the executive – namely to
deprive it of office by passing a vote of no confidence,”106 but again it did not.
Timothy Endicott views this inaction as “an indictment of the House of
Commons,” which, given that the “House of Commons evidently had no
confidence in the Government,” it undoubtedly is.107
Evaluating inaction, however, is more complex. One view of this
parliamentary inaction was as political acquiescence; on this telling, that
Parliament had an opportunity to respond should have sufficed to validate the
prorogation and obviated the need for judicial nullification.108 But the fact that
political controls were available and were not exercised cannot provide a
conclusive answer to the broader underlying question: Was there a pre-existing
reason to be concerned about the vitality of responsible government, such that
Parliament’s acquiescence should raise rather than assuage judicial concern?
Parliamentary accountability, or responsible government, is functionally
supported by two key elements of the broader constitutional framework: the twoparty electoral system and the civil service.109 Both are on tenuous footing.
Party government, in the words of Albert Venn Dicey, is “not the accident
or the corruption but, so to speak, the very foundation of our constitutional
system.”110 Centrism and decisive governing capacity are the benefits of a twoparty system in a “first past the post” voting system. Because any
“administration that does not encompass the median voter is fragile,”111 parties
tend to the center. Extremist minority parties are usually shut out of government,
preventing the instability of multi-party coalition governance.112 Party
allegiance is critical for effective governance; since a cohesive majority party
can enact policies without seeking broader consensus, governance can be
effective, efficient, and partisan. Of course, the pendulum swings easily in such
a system, and “the Opposition of to-day is the Government of to-morrow.”113
But electoral politics, this “regulating wheel” of the British constitution,
may well be off its axle.114 This two-party system has been experiencing
churn.115 Increasing fragmentation, in part because of split loyalties and cross106

McHarg, supra note 35, at 94.
Endicott, supra note 38, at 176.
108
Id.; Finnis, supra note 31, at 15.
109
See Cheryl Saunders, Collaborative Federalism, 61 AUS. J. PUB. ADMIN. 69, 73 (2002). (noting that
“governments are [not only] responsible to parliaments [but also,] through parliaments, to voters”).
110
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxviii (8th ed. 1915).
Portions of this and the following paragraph are drawn from Erin F. Delaney, Brexit Optimism and British
Constitutional Renewal, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 191, 191–210 (Mark Graber et al.
eds., 2018).
111
Iain McLean, ‘England Does Not Love Coalitions’: The Most Misused Political Quotation in the Book,
47 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 3, 6 (2012).
112
Id. (finding only a 0.17 probability of a coalition administration being formed at a general election).
113
IVOR JENNINGS, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 30 (3d ed. 1954).
114
WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 204–05 (2d ed. 1872).
115
See How Democratic are the UK’s Political Parties and Party System?, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT, (Aug.
22,
2018),
https://www.democraticaudit.com/2018/08/22/audit2018-how-democratic-are-the-ukspolitical-parties-and-party-system/ (presenting 2017 general election and subsequent Brexit negotiations
as recalibrating, and obscuring, party–issue associations); see also THE UK’S CHANGING DEMOCRACY:
THE 2018 DEMOCRATIC AUDIT 55 (Patrick Dunleavy et al. eds., 2018) (demonstrating the fluctuation of
the two-party system, which experienced a DV score swing from the most disproportionate to the least
disproportionate outcome in decades from the 2015 election to the 2017 election). A variety of
contributing effects have been identified, including the decline in class-based voting; the rise of
107
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cutting political issues, threatens effectiveness. If the political dynamics
surrounding a particular issue will ensure that neither party can gain electoral
benefit from raising or championing that cause, it is to both parties’ benefit to
avoid legislating on the topic.116 And thus, even when there was a clear majority
of parliamentarians overall to prevent prorogation,117 neither party would be
benefitted by the action. In fact, as Mark Graber has argued in the context of the
United States Congress, the existence of cross-cutting issues will likely lead
elected politicians to defer to other actors in the constitutional scheme, such as
the court.118 As the prorogation battled loomed, “it seems neither the
Government nor the Opposition could command a majority in the Commons,
and so the usual conventional accountability mechanisms appear to have broken
down.”119 The Court could well have inferred that it was the preference of
Parliament to let the Court decide.
Political inaction by both parties in the face of electoral uncertainty is only
one element of the changing political landscape; another is the increasing
presidentialization of the role of Prime Minister, which has had an effect on party
politics and the scope of executive power. It has long been a function of British
elections that local MPs must advance the national party manifesto, and naturally
there is a close connection to the leader’s profile and electoral success.120 But
since the election of Tony Blair in 1997, some have argued that there has been
an increased personalization of elections, in conjunction with new approaches to
the media, including its “professional management” by spin doctors and other
advisors.121 And what appears to be a decreasing importance of (or adherence
to) election manifesto commitments further empowers the Prime Minister.122
“alternative identities” that encourage the creation of new parties; cultural changes, such as a lack of
deference to hierarchy or the politicized role of the media; and the fact of the FPTP system itself, which
allows for minoritarian government. See David Sanders, The UK’s Changing Party System: The
Prospects for a Party Realignment at Westminster, 5 J. BRIT. ACAD. 92, 102–12 (2017); see also Patrick
Leyland, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UK 110 (2012) (“[A] single party receiving between 40 per cent and
45 per cent of the national vote stands a good chance of gaining an overall majority of seats in the House
of Commons and therefore of forming a government.”).
116
This provides an obvious answer to the question animating a number of different scholarly pieces:
Why didn’t Parliament act to repudiate the prorogation when it had the chance?
117
Willis, supra note 34, at 354 (“The Government, while formally retaining the confidence of the House
of Commons, lost its working majority after many Members of Parliament defected. In addition, a crossparty group successfully passed legislation preventing a ‘no deal’ Brexit. In these circumstances, why did
Parliament not determine to resist prorogation directly?”).
118
See generally Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
119
Willis, supra note 34, at 355. The challenges of Brexit itself are reflective of the longstanding problem
that European integration has posed to Britain’s politics. See generally Erin F. Delaney, The Labour
Party’s Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy, 8 J. EUR. INT. HIST.
121 (2002). Party instability led to the calling of the 1975 referendum (Labour) as it did of the 2016
referendum (Conservatives). And it impacted how the 2016 campaign unfolded and potentially the vote
itself. See Delaney, supra note 110, at 191.
120
Richard Heffernan, Why the Prime Minister cannot be a President: Comparing Institutional
Imperatives in Britain and America, 58 PARL. AFF. 53, 6263 (2005).
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A.W. Rhodes, The Court Politics of the Blair Presidency, Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture
Series
at
Parliament
House
(June
27,
2005)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop44/rhodes.pdf).
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See Sir Jeffrey Jowell, ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM COMMITTEE, H.C. 1178-ii, at Q101 (2011) (noting that “one of the most
significant constitutional changes under the 1997 Labour Government . . . was the establishment of the
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day, ‘This is what we are going to do.’”); see also Emma Norris, Manifestos Still Matter Even Though
Their Promises Aren’t Being Delivered, Institute for Government (Nov. 19, 2019),
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Ultimately, replying on Parliament to limit the Executive means relying on the
Prime Minister’s party to do so, an aspirational aim.123
Increasing (or increasingly personalized) executive authority also plays out
in other aspects of “Parliamentary accountability,” including in the critical
limiting function of the civil service. “Whitehall,” or the executive agencies and
departments of the British Government,124 is staffed by a nonpartisan civil
service that has been thought to serve as a soft-veto125 on the tremendous
executive power wielded by the leader of the party in government.126 The civil
service rests on four key principles: “non-partisanship, ministerial accountability
to Parliament, admission by open competition and promotion by ability.”127 As
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution concluded in its 2002
inquiry on The Accountability of Civil Servants, “[i]t is essential that civil
servants provide ministers with candid and fearless advice, including on the
constitutionality of proposed actions,” and if a minister is behaving in an
unconstitutional manner, “it is [the civil servant’s] job to go to the head of the
civil service, who would take it up with the Prime Minister if necessary.”128
But changes over the past few decades have fundamentally shifted this
model. First, the desire for effectiveness or “responsiveness to the government
of the day”129 has encouraged politicians in both parties to reshape “the civil
service to be their tool more than their guardian.”130 Under the Thatcher
Government, the “New Public Management” (NPM) movement “focused on
instilling private sector managerial principles into the public sector and sought
to separate between policy and service delivery through the creation of new
agency structures, as well as contracting out and outsourcing.”131 This led in
turn to increased use of political advisors, who served as “rivals for ministerial
ears”132 and operated outside the expectations of the civil service. The Blair
Government was notable for “the increased power that advisers seemed to enjoy
over career civil servants and their increasingly privileged position as policy

https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/do-manifestos-matter-anymore (finding a decrease over
the past decade in implementation of manifesto commitments).
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See Mark Elliott & Stephen Tierney, Political Pragmatism and Constitutional Principle: The
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political willingness to do so often knows few bounds.”). Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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2008).
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shapers.”133 As one commentator has written, their role is “not to advise
impartially, but to deliver at all costs.”134 And the central node in this web of
advice is the Prime Minister.135
This slow but steady politicization of Whitehall has increased the threat of
executive overreach.136 Barely two weeks before Johnson prorogued Parliament,
a London School of Economics (LSE) blog post argued that “the civil service is
in mortal danger,” due to a rising orientation towards “political governance.”137
As of November 2019, there were over 100 (full time equivalent) special
advisers—“spads”—in government.138 Further, it appears that vertical
accountability (through ministerial responsibility and parliamentary scrutiny)
“may be declining with the entrenchment of political advisors within the
Westminster system.”139
The basic structure of the nineteenth century British constitution has been
under strain for some time, and the problems of party and executive power have
not been fully addressed.140 Indeed, the Court’s decision came shortly after Boris
Johnson had been made Prime Minister through an internal Conservative party
process that allowed only 160,000 eligible party members to vote for the
selection of the new party leader.141 Viewing the Miller II decision against this

Edward Page, Has the Whitehall Model Survived?, 76 INT’L REV. OF ADMIN. SCI. 407, 414 (2010).
John Baker, Our Unwritten Constitution, Lecture, Maccabaean Lecture on Jurisprudence, Proceedings
of
the
British
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94
(2009),
available
at
https://britishacademy.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5871/bacad/9780197264775.001.0001/u
pso-9780197264775-chapter-4.
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See A. W. Rhodes, The Court Politics at 6 (“In the Westminster model, the civil service has a monopoly
of advice and this advice is collated and coordinated by the Cabinet through its ministerial and official
committees and the Cabinet Office. This neat and tidy picture has given way to one of competing centers
of advice and coordination for which, allegedly, Blair is the only nodal point.”).
136
Allison Young, “UK Constitutional Reform – Westminster or Whitehall?” Harry Street Lecture,
University of Manchester, 21 April 2021.
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danger, L.S.E. (Aug. 13, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-the-civil-service-is-inmortal-danger/.
138
See Cabinet Office, Annual Report on Special Advisors (2019), available at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8545
54/Annual_Report_on_Special_Advisers.pdf; see also Gazza, Caino & Roxstar: the Strange World of
Dominic
Cummings’
‘Spads’,
GUARDIAN
(June
24,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jun/24/gazza-caino-and-roxstar-the-strange-world-ofdominic-cummings-spads.
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in committee hearings if special advisors refused. Id. at 126. Nevertheless, breaches of the ministerial
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Norms and the Ministerial Code: Are We Living in a Post-Nolan Era?, 91 POL. Q. 125, 128 (2020).
Ministerial responsibility is a more fine-grained way of understanding responsible government—rather
than the “collective responsibility to Parliament of ministers for all actions of the Government . . . . [it is]
the responsibility to Parliament of individual ministers for the actions of their departments.” See Kinley,
supra note 99, at 119–20. The perceived erosion of civil servant impartiality and accountability, then, is
emblematic of a broader decline in responsible governance within the Westminster system. See Leighton
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backdrop of a slow but steady accrual of executive power provides at least a
plausible pragmatic justification for the prorogation decision.142
*

*

*

The Court’s decision was effective in the immediate term. Parliament went
back to work. But the Court’s broader efforts to bolster Parliament have had only
tepid success. As Mark Elliot and Stephen Tierney write in their assessment of
The EU Withdrawal Act (2018), “to the extent that [Parliamentary] ‘control’ is
being newly exerted in the wake of referendum, it is the executive that finds
itself in the driving seat.”143 And it is far from clear that Miller II will translate
into greater judicial power. Certainly, decisions relying on the basic structure
doctrine may be empowering: one way to build “institutional legitimacy [is] by
reinforcing those features of the constitutional system ‘about which there is
already substantial agreement.’”144 But the evolution of judicial power is more
complex, and the next Part draws on the comparative analogy for (tentative)
insights for the future of the UK Supreme Court.

III: MILLER II AND JUDICIAL POWER
The UK Supreme Court was insistent that the Miller II case presented unusual
circumstances, opening the decision with an acknowledgment that this was
likely a “one off.”145 Others were skeptical.146 Finnis described the
“protestation” as “entirely hollow,” and expects the Court to wade into many
areas heretofore considered off limits.147 This fear of increased judicial power
has been a hallmark of the Brexit era, with oceans of ink spilled on the occasion
of the Miller I decision.148 This Part will briefly review the relationship between
the basic structure doctrine and judicial power in India, to draw some insights
for thinking about how judicial power might (or might not) develop in the United
Elliott, The Miller II Case, supra note 3, at 631–32 (“[W]hat would have followed if the Court had
decided Miller II in such a way as to ascribe to the executive branch an untrammeled power to prorogue
Parliament. The upshot of such a decision would have been to accord to the executive a legally
uncontrollable power that would have equipped it to render the sovereignty of Parliament a dead letter by
proroguing Parliament at will, potentially for long periods and repeatedly.”).
143
Mark Elliott & Stephen Tierney, Political Pragmatism and Constitutional Principle: The European
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, 2019 PUB. L. 37, 60.
144
Partlett, supra note 90, at 945 (citing Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 156
(2001)).
145
Miller II, [2019] UKSC 41 at [1].
146
But see Willis, supra note 34, at 355 (“The one-off nature of the factual circumstances motivating the
Court’s intervention is repeatedly emphasised in the judgment. . . . [I]t stands as a transparent reminder
that in the usual course that potential will not—and ought not to—be realized.”).
147
Finnis, supra note 31, at 26.
148
R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5
(holding that an Act of Parliament was required to initiate the process for withdrawing from the European
Union). A large literature has critiqued the Supreme Court’s decision. See, e.g., Richard Ekins & Graham
Gee, Putting Judicial Power in its Place, 36 QUEENSLAND L. J. 375 (2018); Mark Elliott, Judicial Power
and the United Kingdom’s Changing Constitution, 36 QUEENSLAND L. J. 273 (2018); Mikolaj
Barczentewicz, Miller, Statutory Interpretation, and the True Place of EU Law in UK Law, 2017 PUBLIC
LAW (Brexit Special Extra issue 2017) 10; Mark Elliott, The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller: In
Search of Constitutional Principle, 76 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 257 (2017); Richard Ekins, Constitutional
Practice and Principle in the Article 50 Litigation, 133 L. QUART. REV. 347 (2017).
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Kingdom in the wake of Miller II. I conclude that the future trajectory of judicial
power will most likely be drawn by the Johnson Government, rather than by the
Justices of the Court.
The literature surrounding the evolution of the basic structure doctrine in
India expressly engages the question of judicial power. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta
has written, “[t]he basic structure doctrine, in the minds of many observers,
appears to have replaced parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers
with judicial supremacy.”149 But as scholars have explained, the evolution of
judicial power in India has been far more complex. Three key elements provide
useful insights for the United Kingdom: the role of public interest litigation; the
nature of “judicial attitudes;” and the ways in which political actors respond to
the judicial articulation of the basic structure.
A. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
In India, in conjunction with the rise of the basic structure doctrine was the
advent of a more robust acceptance of public interest litigation,150 operating
against a backdrop of rights discourse and judicial enforcement of rights.151 The
Indian Supreme Court relaxed justiciability doctrines, such as standing and
pleading requirements, in order to permit a wider range of parties to come before
the Court.152 These cases also were marked by the involvement of “Courtappointed investigative and monitoring commissions.”153 The Indian Supreme
Court thus took on important governance responsibilities, leading to its
centrality (and empowerment) within the constitutional system.154 The chance
that the UK Supreme Court will shift towards a governance model is slim. It is
true, as Aileen McHarg has written, that in Miller II, “the court has chosen an
outcome that makes it more rather than less likely that it will be asked to rule on
politically contentious questions in the future.”155 But the UK Supreme Court
does not operate against a backdrop of strong judicial rights review, and active
public interest litigation is still in its nascency in the United Kingdom. There
was virulent (and violent) condemnation of Gina Miller for bringing the
litigation on triggering Article 50 at the time of the Brexit referendum (Miller
I).156 The continued efforts to challenge aspects of the ongoing Brexit process in
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION 179,
180 (Zoya Hasan, E. Sridharan & R. Sudarsha eds., 2005).
150
The two are naturally connected, as the articulation of basic structure demonstrated the Court could
act as a plausible locus for new legal opportunities. Cf. John Ferejohn, Judicial Power: Getting it and
Keeping it, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS 349, 360 (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A.
Kagan eds., 2013).
151
Mehta, supra note 149, at 186.
152
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. OF DEM. 70, 71 (2007).
153
Id.
154
Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest Litigation
in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 175, 220 (2010); Nick Robinson, Expanding
Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 36
(2009).
155
McHarg, supra note 35, at 93.
156
The barrage came from many fronts: from commentators decrying the suit itself as a manipulation of
the judicial process to “produce a tactical, political advantage for their side of the argument” in “an
essentially political dispute,” and accusing Miller of “tinkering in the democratic process,” to social media
threats like a “Kill Gina Miller” Facebook group. Viscount Philips offered 5000 pounds via Facebook to
the first person to “accidentally run over this bloody troublesome first-generation immigrant,” for which
he was sentenced to 12 weeks in prison. Kevin Rawlinson, Viscount Jailed for Offering Money for Killing
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the courts may have started to habituate some to the practice of this kind of
public interest litigation,157 but it is still outside the norm.158
B. JUDICIAL “ATTITUDES”
It is true that “the judicial function is embedded in its own politics, which is
defined in terms of diverse and at times conflicting judicial philosophies and
approaches to constitutional adjudication.”159 Will Partlett has argued that the
“right” kind of judicial attitudes may function to enhance the effectiveness of
courts arguing principles of basic structure. A sense that the judges share in the
project of “building and preserving the integrity of democratic governance,”160
may strengthen their efforts to be independent. Further, a selection process in
which judges are “chosen later in life based on a strong outside reputation in the
legal community,”161 creates a “recognition judiciary,”162 again reinforcing
judicial independence. He notes that in some of the stronger courts, “judges on
these courts were able to play a role in selecting their successors.”163 The justices
in the United Kingdom share many of these features: being part of a recognition
judiciary,164 selecting their successors,165 and having a sense of responsibility
for some role in democratic governance. However, judicial attitudes towards the
judicial role are far from uniform, and there is a deep expressed commitment to
parliamentary sovereignty and judicial restraint.166 Lady Hale, perhaps the most
vocal member of the Court to see its role as a constitutional court,167 retired three
of Gina Miller, GUARDIAN (Jul. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/13/viscountjailed-for-offering-money-for-killing-of-gina-miller; see also GINA MILLER, RISE: LIFE LESSONS IN
SPEAKING OUT, STANDING TALL AND LEADING THE WAY (2018).
157
The vitriol was not only directed at Gina Miller; the judges too were labelled “enemies of the people”
following the Miller I decision in the lower court. Claire Phipps, British Newspapers React to Judges’
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the
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GUARDIAN
(Nov.
4,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/04/enemies-of-the-people-british-newspapers-reactjudges-brexit-ruling. In 2021, The Daily Mail’s Deputy Political Editor implied running the headline was
a mistake. Mail and Sun Promise Kinder, Gentler Editing, MEDIA GUIDO (Jul. 1, 2021), https://orderorder.com/2021/07/01/mail-and-sun-promise-kindler-gentler-editing/.
158
General public interest litigation entities like Liberty and Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) have a
smaller footprint and narrower scope than comparable organizations in the United States, such as the
ACLU, Southern Poverty Law Center, or Natural Resources Defense Council. See Legal Cases, LIBERTY,
https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issues/; Current Test Cases, CHILD POVERTY ACTION GROUP,
https://cpag.org.uk/welfare-rights/test-cases/current; see also Harriett Samuels, Public Interest Litigation
and the Civil Society Factor, 38 LEGAL STUD. 515 (2018) (arguing judicial review reform on standing
and third-parties may further hamper existing entities’ efforts).
159
Michel Rosenfeld, Judicial Politics versus Ordinary Politics, in JUDICIAL POWER 36, 37–38 (Christine
Landfried ed., 2019).
160
Partlett, supra note 90, at 942.
161
Id. at 943 (citing Nuno Garoupa & Thomas Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization
of the Judiciary, 4 J. COMP. L. 228 (2009)).
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See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 161, at 241 (contrasting career and recognition judicial structures,
the latter dominated by individual reputation as perceived by external mechanisms rather than the
collective reputation of the judiciary).
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Partlett, supra note 90, at 943.
164
The selection process historically rested on longevity and reputation, sourced through “secret
soundings” by the Lord Chancellor. See Erin F. Delaney, Searching for constitutional meaning in
institutional design: The debate over judicial appointments in the United Kingdom, 14 INT’L J. CONST’L
L. 752, 755 (2016).
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months after the Miller II decision.168 Finally, the public’s attitude towards the
judiciary matters: The greater the public’s level of comfort with an active and
engaged judiciary, the better the chance of compliance with judicial claims to
demarcating basic structure.169 In the United Kingdom, even if members of the
judiciary understand their (and the Court’s) roles as robust protectors of the
constitutional system, it is far from clear the British public shares that view.
C. THE POLITICIANS’ RESPONSE
The 1973 Kesavananda decision was only the first chapter in the evolving
story of the basic structure doctrine in India. Scholars agree that the case was not
perceived as a legitimate use of the judicial function when it came down.170 The
Kesavananda decision limited the ability of the Indian Parliament to implement
land reform, by finding elements of Article 24 of the Constitution to violate the
“basic structure” of the Indian constitution. And indeed, the close 7-6 decision,
issued in a weighty 703 pages,171 was not met with a positive reception from the
Indira Gandhi Government. An unprecedented attack on the judiciary followed,
with obvious efforts to court pack,172 as well as attempted limits on judicial
review, including the declaration of a State of Emergency.173 In the subsequent
1977 election, the Congress Party lost power.174 And when Gandhi’s attempts to
limit judicial review came before the Court in 1980, in Minerva Mills v. Union
of India,175 her overreaching “accomplished what all previous debate over
property-related amendments had failed to do—establish the legitimacy of the
unconstitutional constitutional amendment.”176 Judicial review itself was
understood to be “an integral part of good governance.”177
legality to protect fundamental rights and the rule of law); Lady Hale, Who Guards the Guardians?,
Public Law Project Conference Lecture (Oct. 14, 2013) (reaffirming judicial review as “a critical check
on the power of the state, providing an effective mechanism for challenging the decisions, acts or
omissions of public bodies to ensure that they are lawful”).
168
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2019),
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170
KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 56, at 224 (“An overall assessment of the sociological legitimacy of the
basic structure doctrine in this period among legal and political elites [right after it emerged] leads us to
the conclusion that the doctrine was perceived to be illegitimate.”); S.P. Sathe, Limitation on
Constitutional Amendment, in INDIAN CONSTITUTION: TRENDS AND ISSUES 183 (R. Dhavan & A. Jacobs
eds., 1977) (“Kesavanada did not enjoy legitimacy in 1973.”).
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Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 (invalidating constitutional amendment that insulated
prime minister elections from judicial review). S.P. Sathe, Limitation on Constitutional Amendment, in
INDIAN CONSTITUTION: TRENDS AND ISSUES 183 (R. Dhavan & A. Jacobs eds., 1977) (“It was the
Election case that earned legitimacy for Kesavananda.”). See also KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 56, at xx
(“The court’s persistence with the doctrine in Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain and Minerva Mills v Union of
India in dramatically different political circumstances convinced many sceptics that this doctrine was
worthy of respect.”).
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John Ferejohn, Judicial Power: Getting it and Keeping it, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS 349, 357 (Diana
Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2013) (“In retrospect, we can see that the
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In short, the extent of the Supreme Court of India’s power emerged only
later, after the political response by Gandhi forced another high-profile case to
the Court, threatening judicial review itself. The pattern of extreme
majoritarianism, including the declaration of the Emergency, only reinforced the
Court’s role as holding the line against democratic decay. Whether Miller II is
really a “one-off” case will rest with how far the Johnson Government goes in
pushing back against it. And all indications point to ongoing tension between
the Executive and the Court.
In the wake of the Miller II decision,178 Conservatives renewed calls to rein
in judicial power and codified a commitment to reform in the Conservative
manifesto ahead of the December 2019 general election.179 The party broadly
pledged that in its first year, a Conservative government would “restore trust” in
UK institutions and democracy by evaluating the “relationship between the
Government, Parliament and the courts” and the “functioning of the Royal
Prerogative.”180 In July 2020, the Johnson Government created the Independent
Review of Administrative Law (IRAL),181 appointing and charging an
independent panel of experts with broad terms of reference that contemplated
sweeping reforms.182 The panel’s report, issued in March 2021, did not take up
this invitation, however, and advanced only two narrow reforms.183 Indeed, the
report recommended that courts apply “anxious scrutiny” on questions of public
power, and judicial overreach solutions “must come from the courts” rather than
legislation.184 The Government bristled at this milquetoast response and did not

U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 36 (2009).
178
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about justiciability and the possibility that courts may be unduly interfering with the Executive’s ‘right
to govern.’”).
179
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https://www.conservatives.com/our-plan (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9707
97/IRAL-report.pdf. The panel acknowledged this political backdrop in its report. Id. at 11.
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Including codifying the grounds of judicial review, narrowing the scope of justiciability, limiting the
grounds on which unlawfulness results in nullity, and altering the law of standing. MINISTRY OF JUST.,
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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f27d3128fa8f57ac14f693e/independent-review-ofadministrative-law-tor.pdf; see Mark Elliott, The Judicial Review I: The Reform Agenda and its Potential
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defer to the panel’s findings,185 but rather interpreted the report expansively,186
introduced additional proposals,187 and in the Queen’s speech in May 2021,
confirmed it would move forward with a reform bill designed to restore the
“balance of power between the executive, legislature, and the courts.”188
In fact, the Judicial Review and Courts Bill, introduced in the House of
Commons on July 21, 2021,189 makes only incremental changes to judicial
review proceedings, reflecting the recommendations made by the IRAL
report.190 Those skeptical of judicial power were disappointed by the Bill;
Richard Ekins outlined a set of possible improvements in a Policy Exchange
paper that caught the attention of the politicians.191 A subset of Ekins’s
suggestions were tabled as amendments to the Bill by Sir John Hayes, a
Conservative MP serving as Minister for Transport, and Tom Hunt MP.192 The
alterations included, among others, a clause to render prorogation of Parliament
non-justiciable, a clause to make parliamentary accountability non-justiciable,
as well as a clause to affirm the unlimitable principle of parliamentary
sovereignty.193 The amendments were ultimately withdrawn, however, and are
not reflected in the version of the Bill which passed Committee in late
November, 2021.194
The fairly modest and technical nature of the Bill may nevertheless portend
a more ambitious agenda to curtail the judiciary. On the day the Bill was
introduced, then-Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice Robert
Buckland, speaking at the Policy Exchange, emphasized this incrementalism as
a strength, the Bill thus serving as a “template or prototype” for “other proposals
coming down the line which you might find more controversial.”195 And some
The Bar Council raised it was “very concerned” that the Government’s proposals went beyond those
recommended by IRAL, calling them “far-reaching” and “fundamental.” BAR COUNCIL RESPONSE TO
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3
(Apr.
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executive or parliament). Lord Faulks, the head of the panel, pushed back on this interpretation, stating
the panel findings of a few cases of overreach are not reflective of an “over drift” and warned against
equating the “particular and the general.” Law in Action, Reforming Judicial Review, BBC 4 at 2:30 (Apr.
23, 2021), https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m000td1g.
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have argued that the Bill is deliberately a small step, a “quick-and-dirty minimal
viable product” to test the market’s appetite for and resistance to judicial reform,
with more sweeping reforms to come.196 It is the potential of further reforms to
judicial review—perhaps in the context of “updating” the Human Rights Act
1998 or reviewing the Constitutional Reform Act 2005—that may ultimately put
the Court to the test.197 As Buckland said in June 2021, the Government’s vision
is for the judiciary to be the “servant[] of Parliament.”198 But, of course, it is the
Court’s vision that the Executive be the servant of Parliament. And the Court
has never been afraid to protect its own role in the constitutional scheme,
particularly regarding judicial review,199 which may well be a basic structure of
the British constitution.200
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CONCLUSION
Tierney may be right that Miller II is a harbinger of constitutional change:
the increased (and increasing) willingness of the Court to sublimate politics (and
the political constitution) to the rule of law. But as Aileen Kavanagh has written
persuasively, “we should also be careful not to let an acute focus on the evils of
an ermined elite blind us to the much more powerful existential threats facing
the British constitutional order today, namely, the growing popular distrust of
elected politicians; the erosion of shared political norms amongst the governing
elites; the contracting out of key public services; and the tyranny of the tabloids,
to name but a few.”201 Add the expanding power of the Executive, the changing
nature of political parties, and the weakening of the civil service to this list,202
and judicialization may turn out to be a symptom rather than the cause of the
UK’s constitutional distress.
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